Non-Cooperativity in Bayesian Social Learning by Palasek, Stan
S. Palasek
Non-Cooperativity in Bayesian Social Learning
Stan Palasek
Princeton University
July 2014
Abstract
We describe a Bayesian model for social learning of a random variable in which
agents might observe each other over a directed network. The outcomes produced are
compared to those from a model in which observations occur randomly over a complete
graph. In both cases we observe a nontrivial level of observation which maximizes
learning, though individuals have strong incentive to defect from the societal optimum.
The implications of such competition over information commons are discussed.
I. Introduction
Trends and fads, though at times ill-
informed, are ubiquitous features of hu-
man societies. The mathematical exam-
ination of the origins of these trends as
cascades of questionable wisdom was per-
haps pioneered in 1992 by Banerjee [1] and
independently Bikhchandani et al. [2] Al-
though it is rational for agents to observe
the actions of others and to update their
own beliefs accordingly, Banerjee notes the
dilemma that “the very act of trying to use
the information contained in the decisions
made by others makes each person’s de-
cision less responsive to her own informa-
tion and hence less informative to others.”
Vives similarly showed that when agents’
observations are governed by a benevolent
organizer, social learning is more effective
than when each individual is acting strictly
in his or her own interest. The observed in-
efficiency is a manifestation of an “underin-
vestment in production of public informa-
tion,” which limits exploration of unpop-
ular decisions and propagates herding. [3]
These results may go a long way in ex-
plaining the emergence of societal trends
which may seem irrational to those with
access to a different stream of information.
Indeed, theories concerning social learning
have found a number of applications includ-
ing finance, [4, 5] policy, [6] and the adop-
tion of new ideas and technologies in the
developing world. [7, 8, 9]
II. Social learning model
We consider a system similar to that in
Salge & Polani [10]. Here, there are n
slots, of which one hides a reward which
is being sought by n agents. At each time
step, with probability p  1 the reward
is randomly relocated. A random agent
a is then selected uniformly and indepen-
dently who observes the slot s that it be-
lieves most likely to contain the reward. All
m agents perform a na¨ıve Bayes update:
the ath agent’s based on the result of its ob-
servation of s, and the other agents’ based
on the fact that a elected to observe s. This
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update takes into account the possibility
that the target has moved, removing the
risk that agents get “stuck” having unsuc-
cessfully checked all n loci.
As discussed in [10], an agent’s actions
are chosen in consideration of its previous
observations and therefore contain poten-
tially useful information. For instance, in
a simple model with no Bayesian updating
and p = 0, it can be shown that the condi-
tional probability of the reward being at s
given that an agent chooses to observe s is
twice the conditional probability given that
an agent choses to observe a slot other than
s. We might expect that introducing social
updating only injects more useful informa-
tion into agents’ choices.
Described so far has been a model for
social learning where the underlying social
network is the complete graph of order m.
More generally, we can consider the same
process but with agents constrained to per-
form Bayesian updates only for those with
whom they are connected on a graph G.
Note that at times we will allow G to be di-
rected; ie. for some (perhaps artificial) rea-
son, an agent i employs information from j
but not vice versa.
We make several key changes to Salge
& Polani’s model which we believe make
this formulation more realistic. First, here
we do not reset the beliefs of an agent
once it discovers the location of the reward.
We admit that occasionally injecting maxi-
mum entropy makes sense when p = 0 since
the game would otherwise be “solved” and
quickly reach a steady state. However, the
fact that the location of the reward changes
simultaneously for the entire ensemble sug-
gests that all the agents are within a single
environment and it would therefore be un-
natural for some to abruptly forget infor-
mation or be replaced.
Second, here we use a social network
to limit information consumption (as in
[11, 12, 13]) rather than throwing out ob-
servations with a uniform probability 1−po
(reminiscent of [14]). Although the lat-
ter model is appealing in the sense that
it provides a linear continuum between a
non-social situation (po = 0, or all isolated
nodes) and complete observability (po = 1,
or G is complete), it is far more natu-
ral for agents to form social networks and
learn from those with whom they are con-
nected. Indeed, one might expect the uni-
formly random information selection to be
analogous to learning on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random graph since they must both ex-
hibit low diameter, clustering, and a bi-
nomial degree distribution. The authors
suggested the random ignorance model as
something that social agents might form
strategically rather than something that is
inherent within their decision-making pro-
cesses, the plausibility of which we will in-
vestigate later.
Finally, here we order the agent obser-
vations uniformly and independently rather
than in a predetermined sequence. This
change was necessitated by the present use
of the network model in lieu of random ob-
servation. The latter formulation is sym-
metric because the choice of information
disposal is i.i.d. The arbitrary designation
of an order is therefore of little concern. In
the current model, however, the underlying
graph is generally asymmetric so an arbi-
trary ordering of the agents may introduce
harmful bias. Random ordering avoids this
complication.
III. Graph Connectivity
Results
A major result of [10] is that maximal learn-
ing occurs at some intermediate 0 < po < 1.
We will illustrate an analogous fact for our
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network-based model with the modifica-
tions detailed above. In particular, we ex-
ecute the described process for graphs cho-
sen uniformly at random from the set of
graphs with n vertices and i edges, for each
i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,
(
n
2
)
.
Figure 1: Simulation results for n = 15, p = 0.01,
and a Bayes’ factor of 2 between positive and neg-
ative observations. Depicted are the results of 50
trials each a mean of 1000 iterations at each edge
count from 1 to 100.
The results are shown in Figure 1. We
see, as in [10], that there indeed exists
an optimal quantity of information to be
collected by social agents, as learning is
maximized when the graph has approxi-
mately 25 edges, or when the mean de-
gree is 3.3. For very disconnected networks,
agents have little access to the information
contained in others’ actions which, as we
argued, has a Bayes’ factor of at least two.
Conversely, when the network has most of
its possible edges present, we observe that
herding behavior to incorrect slots is preva-
lent. This is illustrated in Figure 2 which
depicts the simulation over a complete net-
work during which the agents spend most of
their time at only a handful of spots which
rarely contain the reward.
Figure 2: The location of the treasure (black) and
the slot chosen at a given time (orange) for the
same parameter set as Figure 1. Representative
data for a society over a complete graph are shown,
and misinformed herding behavior is evident.
On these grounds alone, [10] suggests
that rational agents might voluntarily ig-
nore information to achieve po < 1 or,
in this setting, a non-complete graph. In
the next sections we will evaluate whether
agents truly have any incentive to do so, or
whether defecting from an optimal configu-
ration would suit one’s individual interests
at the expense of those of the group.
IV. Stability over Complete G
The notion that agents freely decide whose
information to take into account and to
what extent suggests that by default they
have at their disposal more information
than they would optimally use. In this
section we will therefore take the com-
plete graph as a starting point of our in-
vestigation of stability and consider devi-
ations thence. Should we see that from
here no one has incentive to discard infor-
mation, then we must conclude that the
complete graph constitutes a stable equilib-
rium. However, the prevalence of harmful
herding as demonstrated in the last section
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would lead one to expect that agents are
eager to defect from complete networks so
as to minimize their susceptibility to cas-
cades of false information. We test this by
modifying a complete graph such that a test
node, originally of degree m − 1, instead
has degree i for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1. Since
the original graph was complete and there-
fore symmetric, there is a unique unlabeled
graph for each i. This will be an instance,
as we hinted at earlier, in which the graph
is directed (except when i = 14) since an
agent’s decision to disregard data from its
neighbor has no bearing on its neighbor’s
reciprocal observation.
Figure 3: Simulation results for every possi-
ble single-agent deviation from a complete graph.
Depicted are time series for both the defecting
agent (orange) and the remaining m−1 collectively
(black). The parameter set is the same as that from
Figure 1. Both series for t ≥ 1 follow power laws
with R2 = 0.999 with forms P = 0.0293 × d−0.177
(individual) and P = 0.0261×d−0.134 (society). We
do not show data for the individual non-defecting
agents for they vary in proportion with the aggre-
gate data.
The result of the simulation is shown in
Figure 3. As expected, single agents are
generally rewarded for severing ties from
a complete network. The only robust ex-
ception is in the transition from maintain-
ing one connection to becoming isolated, in
which the defecting node takes a slight loss
in performance by disconnecting itself com-
pletely. Furthermore, we see that the im-
provement in the defector’s performance is
mirrored in the welfare gain experienced by
the rest of society. We must then ask, given
that deviations from the complete network
are incentivised, to what density the net-
work must be cleared for no defection to
be motivated, should such a stable network
exist at all.
V. Stability over Sparse G
Next, rather than beginning with a com-
plete graph, we will instead consider the the
highest performance graph with edge count
near the extremum of Figure 1, chosen out
of the 100,000 random 15-order graphs ex-
amined. This graph, call it G0, is depicted
in Figure 4 and it may be near the equilib-
rium, should one exist.
Figure 4: G0, the highest-performing graph with
edge count near 25 among the 100,000 sampled
graphs depicted in Figure 1. The “test vertex” is
highlighted in red.
For the purpose of illustration we will
arbitrarily designate the node highlighted
in red as the test vertex which will defect
from its current situation in G0 during our
experiments. In particular, we will repeat
the simulation from the previous section
upon this graph G0 by varying the order
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of the text vertex. This procedure differs
in that now inasmuch as the starting graph
is asymmetric, there is not a unique graph
with the required properties. We will there-
fore select a uniformly random degree inclu-
sively between 0 and m and then choose the
network randomly from the class of graphs
in which the test vertex has the selected de-
gree and connections between non-test ver-
tices are unchanged.
Figure 5: Learning performance over optimal
graph G0 with the test model’s connections sys-
tematically modified. 50,000 trials were executed
with the same parameter set used in Figure 1. De-
picted are both the performance of the test node (or-
ange) and the rest of the network (black). Both
time series are fit to power laws with R2 = 0.9999
with forms P = 0.0353 × d0.0466 (individual) and
P = 0.0339× d−0.00762 (society).
Figure 5 depicts the results, which show
that the test node can expect a robust in-
crease in its average performance by ob-
serving more agents. Meanwhile, as long
as the test agent is connected to someone,
its behavior ceases to have a measurable ef-
fect on the success of the others. Because
the test agent, already occupying one of the
better-connected nodes in the network, is
motivated to expand his observation of the
other agents, we conclude that this network
does not present a stable environment when
individuals are free to adjust their informa-
tion consumption. Figure 6 confirms that
this observation is a general one and that
all nodes–not just the test node of Figure 4–
are motivated to defect to complete obser-
vation.
Figure 6: Mean performance improvements for
each node of G0 upon independently defecting to
complete observation. The same parameter set from
Figure 1 is employed with 1000 trials for each node.
The outlying datum is that of the isolated node seen
in Figure 4.
VI. Stability with Random
Observation
One might come to believe that the insta-
bility we have identified when individuals
are free to choose which information to con-
sider is a feature of our graph model and
is not present in the random observation
model of [10]. Here we will show that the
phenomenon is present regardless.
Now instead of each agent forming its
beliefs according to its connections in a di-
rected graph, it will use information from
a given agent at a given time with some
probability po. As noted before, varying
po between 0 and 1 interpolates between
the null and complete graphs. In order to
understand the incentives of agents to de-
viate from the po that is ideal for society
as a whole, we first set all agents’ obser-
vation probabilities to p0 = 0.196, the op-
timal probability identified among 10,000
5
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trials with the same parameter set that we
have used throughout. We then allow the
observation probability of a single test node
to vary.1 The results are depicted in Fig-
ure 7. We conclude that the test agent,
and therefore every agent by symmetry of
the model, has incentive to increase its ob-
servation probability far past the optimum
for society. Therefore, despite po = 0.196
being ideal for society as a whole, it will
not be adhered to by rational agents who
can freely choose their observation rates.
Figure 7: Learning performance for test node as
it defects from the societal ideal po = 0.196. 10,000
trials were executed, each time selecting a random
observation probability for the test node. Data are
subjected to exponential moving averaging with a
smoothing factor of 0.0005.
VII. Game Theory
Up to this point we have been employ-
ing language as though we are examining
a competitive game without being explicit
about its components. It will become ap-
parent as we do so how naturally our for-
mulation can be viewed as a normal-form
game.
Let the game have m players corre-
sponding to the society’s agents. A pure
strategy profile is any directed graph G over
m labeled nodes in which the ith agent has
control over the ith row of G’s adjacency
matrix. The payoffs are defined as the av-
erage performance for each agent when the
described simulation is carried out over G.2
We assume that the agents’ information on
the simulation’s rules, including the value
of p, is complete.3 In terms of this game,
we can summarize the results of the pre-
vious two sections by noting that neither
the complete graph nor G0 is a Nash equi-
librium since someone, and in fact every-
one, gains a profit on average by defecting.
Furthermore, the complete graph is Pareto
inefficient by Figure 3. We might wish to
find a stable outcome, ie. a Nash equilib-
rium, but as we are considering only pure
strategies, Nash’s theorem does not guar-
antee their existence. [18] To find equilib-
ria exhaustively is intractable for the num-
ber of unlabeled undirected graphs when
m = 15 is on the order of 1019. [19] When
directed edges are introduced the space be-
comes larger still by orders of magnitude.
We may still, however, computationally
identify an equilibrium within the obser-
vation probability model. Here, although
the strategy space is continuous, it is one-
dimensional and thus easy to search. We
proceed as follows. Let pt be the observa-
tion probability used by the test individual,
and ps the probability for the rest of soci-
ety. Let the expected performance of the
test individual be given by U(ps, pt). In
equilibrium, no individual has incentive to
1The choice of the test node does not matter because here there is no underlying graph to introduce
asymmetry.
2It is reasonable to expect that agents act upon the expectation of their utility. [15] For a treatment
that does not neglect the stochastic nature of learning performance, one might consider games with “fuzzy”
payoffs; see, for instance, [16]
3One need not make this assumption. See Dekel et al. [17] who examine learning without it.
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deviate from ps. Therefore, we seek a solu-
tion (ps, pt) ∈ [0, 1]2 to
ps = arg max
pt
U(ps, pt). (1)
Clearly when po = 0, there is no widespread
risk of herding so the test agent’s best-
response is a pt near 1. Furthermore, as we
showed in Section IV, when po = 1 the best-
response is a near-zero level of observation.
These facts combined with the continuity of
the right-hand side of (1) and the interme-
diate value theorem would imply that there
exists a solution to the equation. How-
ever, due to the prevalence of phase behav-
ior as the degree of connectivity of societies
varies, [20] we cannot be certain as to how
the function behaves in practice. With this
in mind we evaluate the function in silico.
The left- and right-hand sides of (1) are
shown respectively in orange and black in
Figure 8.
Figure 8: The test node’s best-response observa-
tion probability is depicted at various societal ob-
servation probabilities. The data represent 25,000
random samples of values for ps and pt. The best
response function is fitted to an exponential with
p∗t = 0.89 × exp(−2.84 × ps). (1) is satisfied when
the best-response series (black) coincides with the
locus ps = pt (orange).
VIII. Discussion
We, as in [10], determine that maximal so-
cial learning occurs when not all informa-
tion is taken into account by all agents. The
authors go on to detail the reasonable corol-
lary that rational agents will voluntarily
discard much of their information–between
70 and 80% according to both our analy-
ses. Doing so gives individuals’ own ob-
servations greater weight in their Bayesian
beliefs, thus globally limiting the impetus
for herding which, as seen in Figure 2, is
often to the wrong location. Our objec-
tion to this reasoning is as follows. A single
agent, by defecting and letting the extent
of its observation be universal (or nearly
so), has little effect on the prevalence of
herding, as it is necessarily a population-
wide phenomenon. However, its defection
yields in its favor a significant improvement
in its ability to take advantage of emerg-
ing trends. Since the propensity for false
information cascades has hardly increased,
the defecting agent enjoys greater perfor-
mance. Such an argument applies to any
and therefore every member of the society.
Consequently, we cannot expect rational in-
dividuals that have the ability to increase
the extent of their observation to adhere to
the welfare-maximizing level of information
consumption.
This dilemma is highly reminiscent of
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons. [21]
There is a common resource in our sys-
tem: information uncontaminated by neg-
ative information cascades. Acting in its
own self-interest, each agent is strongly mo-
tivated to maximally consume this informa-
tion (see Figures 5, 6, and 7). However,
as the common pool of information be-
comes over-consumed, small random flocks
to potentially incorrect loci are accentuated
and herding behavior emerges; thus the re-
source is of far lesser use.
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As Hardin famously pointed out, there
is no technical solution to such problems
of overconsumption. Fortunately, nature
seems to impose a limit herself, for hu-
man societies are typically arranged in non-
complete social networks. This raises the
question of whether the properties exhib-
ited by graphs of actual human commu-
nities are particularly conducive to such
learning. One might also wonder, if such
learning processes played any role in the
adoption of technologies by early man
which would have in turn correlated with
survival probabilities, why defectors did not
invade populations of mutual cooperators.
For this we refer to the extensive literature
on the evolution of cooperation in which
these same questions are addressed in a
general setting. [22, 23, 24]
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